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We examine the role of information networks in job-search outcomes of displaced 
individuals. We draw on longitudinal Social Security records covering the universe of 
worker-firm matches in a tight labor market in Northern Italy. Unlike previous research, we 
focus on workplace networks whose labor market attributes we are able to describe 
extensively. A workplace network is defined as all coworkers a displaced individual worked 
with prior to displacement. Estimates of network effects are thus affected by omitted variable 
bias if the labor market sorts workers across firms along relevant determinants of search 
outcomes and network characteristics or if past coworkers are exposed to the same shocks. 
The empirical strategy accounts for these possibilities by comparing subsequent outcomes of 
workers displaced by the same firm; in addition, we exploit the longitudinal dimension to 
develop controls for potential residual within-firm heterogeneity. In particular, we control 
for pre-displacement wages and employment status as well as descriptions of pre-
displacement firms and their workforce. Contacts’ labor market attributes have a significant 
effect on a variety of job search outcomes. Employed contacts significantly increase the 
probability of re-employment. They are more effective if they experienced a recent job 
change and when geographically and technologically closer to the displaced. Stronger ties 
and lower competition for the available information also speed up re-employment. While 
largely irrelevant for unemployment duration, contacts’ quality is a significant determinant 
of entry wages and subsequent job stability. 
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∗ Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. 1 Introduction1
Social contacts are known to be a prominent and eﬀective source of employment for job
seekers (Rees (1966), Granovetter (1973), Blau and Robins (1990), Holzer (1988), Holzer
(1987)). This simple fact is shown to have powerful implications. Models of job informa-
tion network detail how diﬀerential access to information determined by the characteristics
of one’s contacts may have signiﬁcant and long lasting eﬀects not only for the individual,
but also for the social network he is embedded in as a whole2. Intuitively, an employed
acquaintance is likely to be a better source of job-related information than someone who
is unemployed. Thus, having more employed contacts improves on the information a job-
seeker has access to and, in turn, his outcomes. Similar mechanisms are potentially able
to explain stylized facts such as the signiﬁcant variability in labor market participation,
employment rates, unemployment persistence, and earnings observed across geographic
or socio-demographic groups, and to qualify part of the more general neighborhood eﬀects
found in the empirical literature3. Additionally, they have important implications for the
1We are indebted to Antonio Ciccone for comments, discussions and continuing support. We thank
Josh Angrist, Toni Calvo, Ken Chay, Juan Dolado, Maia Guell, Andrea Ichino, Juan Jimeno, Gilles Saint-
Paul, Sevi Rodriguez-Mora, and seminar participants at AIEL 2004, 2004 Brucchi-Luchino Workshop,
EALE/SOLE 2005, Bank of Italy, Bocconi University, University of Padova, University of Berkeley. We
thank the Center for Labor Economics at UC Berkeley for hospitality. Many thanks to Giuseppe Tattara
and Marco Valentini for supplying and helping us with the data. We are responsible for any mistakes.
The views expressed here are our own and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy. Email:
federico.cingano@bancaditalia.it, alfonso.rosolia@bancaditalia.it
2Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004), Bramoull` e and Saint-Paul (2004), Montgomery (1991), Ben-
tolila, Michelacci and Su` arez (2004), Fontaine (2004), Arrow and Borzekowski (2004), Calvo-Armengol
(2004), Wahba and Zenou (2005). See Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) for a detailed survey of the
job information networks literature.
3The correlation of a number of individual outcomes within residential locations and their large vari-
ations across locations is widely documented. A considerable eﬀort is devoted to understanding whether
this is the result of certain neighborhood characteristics aﬀecting individuals’ behaviors (among others,
Case and Katz (1991), Cutler and Glaeser (1997), Ludwig, Duncan and Hirschﬁeld (2001)). This may be
due to a number of mechanisms beyond local information sharing: social norms (Akerlof (1997), Akerlof
and Kranton (2002)), conformism, access to resource. As concerns labor market outcomes, Weinberg,
Reagan and Yankow (2004) show that living in better neighborhoods increases the number of hours
worked. However, Katz, Kling and Liebman (2001) provide evidence that neighborhood eﬀects, while8
optimal design of policies, suggesting that the informational spillovers may be stronger
when interventions can be initially targeted to connected clusters of individuals rather
than scattered around; the beneﬁts will then expand to other individuals through the
dissemination of information (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004)).
Evidence that contacts’ characteristics matter for individual employment performances
is limited to few recent studies. Datcher Loury (2006) shows that, while jobs found
through contacts are generally not diﬀerent from jobs found through other methods,
when the job is obtained through a prime-age male contact it pays a higher wage and
lasts longer. In a diﬀerent setting, Bayer, Ross and Topa (2005) show that a higher
quality of available job referrals at the block level raises employment, wages and hours
worked4. Similarly, Munshi (2003) shows that new immigrants from Mexican communities
with a larger proportion of individuals already settled in the US fare better in terms of
employment likelihood and job quality5. These works mainly look at network diﬀerences
along socio-demographic dimensions. While largely unexplored, contacts’ current labor
market status is arguably a major aspect of job information networks. On the one hand,
it certainly is a signiﬁcant determinant of the job-related information a contact has access
to and is willing to share; on the other, it suggests the existence of spillover eﬀects.
signiﬁcant on measures of well being and health, appear to insigniﬁcant on labor market outcomes of
heads of households who participated in the Boston MTO program. Similarly, Oreopoulos (2003) uses
randomised participation into public housing programs in Toronto to conclude that growing up in poor
neighborhoods has no long-lasting eﬀects on labor market performance.
4At a more aggregate level, Topa (2001) documents a high correlation in unemployment rates across
neighboring Census tracts in Chicago, especially in areas with less skilled workers and larger fractions of
minorities. Wahba and Zenou (2005) ﬁnd that it is more likely to have found a job through contacts in
lower unemployment areas in Egypt.
5In other contexts, Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) show that welfare use is correlated
within language groups in a given area even after accounting for most sources of omitted variable bias;
Grinblatt, Keloharju and Ikaheimo (2004) ﬁnd similar eﬀects in automobile purchases among close neigh-
bors in Finland.9
In this paper we directly address the eﬀects of contacts’ labor market attributes on a
number of individual job search outcomes6. We draw on Social Security records covering
the universe of worker-ﬁrm matches in a small dense labor market in Italy. We focus on
a sample of workers displaced by several ﬁrm closures and deﬁne an individual’s social
network as all of his coworkers in the 5 years prior to displacement. The data allow
us to investigate the role of job information networks for a number of largely unexplored
post-displacement outcomes such as unemployment duration, job stability and subsequent
employment probability along with entry wages and other job characteristics. We relate
these outcomes to descriptions of contacts’ current employment status and job seniority,
proximity to the displaced along several metrics, quality, numerousness and to the de-
gree of competition for the available job-related information. Importantly, some of these
network features can be explicit policy targets, thereby conveying policy content to our
estimates. For example, we quantify the eﬀects on job search outcomes of contacts’ tenure
on the current job thus providing an additional element for the correct evaluation of the
cost-beneﬁt trade-oﬀ of active labor market policies aimed at speeding up re-employment.
Unlike previous research, we focus on contacts established on the workplace7. We thus
explore job information networks among individuals who are connected and have direct
experience of each other’s skills by having shared the workplace. This is especially true in
our setting because of the very small size of ﬁrms. In this sense, workplace contacts are
likely to be a prominent source of information when searching for a job8. An important
6By labor market attributes we loosely refer to contacts’ employment status, as well as match quality,
tenure, and a number of job-related characteristics such as location and industry.
7To our knowledge, only Lalive (2003) adopts a deﬁnition of network similar to ours to show that a
policy change that extended the duration of unemployment beneﬁts for older workers in certain Austrian
regions had some eﬀect on slightly younger unaﬀected members of the same network.
8Bayer et al. (2005) ﬁnd that also the place of residence may be an important source of job information10
advantage of focussing on workplace networks is that we make explicit when and why two
individuals met. Estimation of social eﬀects is complicated by the possibility that individ-
uals choose to get together, the determinants of this choice being generally unobserved,
and this may lead to sorting along relevant unobservables driving the empirical correlation
between individual outcomes9(Manski (1993), Moﬃtt (2001)). In our setting, outcomes
of an individual and of his contacts are spuriously correlated if the labor market sorts
workers across ﬁrms along relevant dimensions or if workers become similar by working
together (e.g. they accumulate the same speciﬁc skills). The data allow us to deal with
these speciﬁc concerns in a number of complementary ways. First, we account for hetero-
geneity in unobservable workers’ characteristics across closing ﬁrms with a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀect. This implies that our results are obtained by comparing subsequent out-
comes of workers displaced by the same ﬁrm closure. In addition, we exploit within-ﬁrm
heterogeneity in workers’ residential location and pre-displacement sectoral experience to
allow for year-speciﬁc city and 3-digit industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Finally, the longitudinal
dimension of the data allows us to account for potential residual heterogeneity by control-
ling for a number of pre-displacement realizations of relevant individual outcomes such as
wages, wage growth and unemployment as well as for several characteristics of past ﬁrms.
Identiﬁcation thus primarily comes from variations in the current labor market attributes
of the diﬀerent sets of contacts co-displaced coworkers have access to at displacement
by showing that people living at the same block are more likely to work at the same location even when
most sources of spurious correlation are accounted for; Munshi (2003) provides elements in favour of
networks based on origin community among Mexican migrants.
9An exception is Weinberg et al. (2004) where the neighborhood choice is explicitly modeled. Other
studies of neighborhood and social eﬀects rely on quasi-random neighborhood or peer assignment (among
others, Case and Katz (1991), Katz et al. (2001), Sacerdote (2001)) or on exogenous changes in the
outcomes or composition of peers (Angrist and Lang (2004), Hoxby (2000), Cipollone and Rosolia (2005)).11
date. The main identifying assumption is that this variation is orthogonal to within-ﬁrm
unobserved individual heterogeneity. We provide indirect tests of this assumption relat-
ing current contacts’ labor market status to individual pre-displacement outcomes and,
more importantly, by showing that post-displacement individual outcomes are unrelated
to pre-displacement contacts’ labor market status.
Our ﬁndings show that network eﬀects are sizeable. In our preferred speciﬁcation a one
standard deviation increase in the share of employed contacts shortens unemployment
duration by 7 per cent, about 3 weeks at the average spell. This eﬀect is considerably
stronger if contacts recently changed job, separating from those ﬁrms where they over-
lapped with the displaced. According to our estimates, increasing the employment rate by
raising the share of recent job switchers reduces the average unemployment spell by about
5 weeks, as opposed to 15 days if the increase is due to contacts who did not switch job.
These results suggest employed job switchers increase the available job-related informa-
tion in the network. In fact, exploring network eﬀects during unemployment reveals that
the advantages of being endowed with larger shares of recent job switchers are strongest
at short durations. We also ﬁnd that competition for the available information matters.
A higher number of displaced individuals connected to a given contact signiﬁcantly de-
lays re-employment. On the other hand, stronger ties with employed contacts increase
the probability of ﬁnding a job. Finally, our estimates show that contacts’ quality, at
best only a weak determinant of unemployment duration, signiﬁcantly contributes to the
quality of the new job. In particular a one standard deviation increase in contacts’ wage
premium raises average weekly wages in the entry year by about 2 percent and the prob-
ability of holding the same job after 12 months by 2.5 percentage points. These ﬁndings12
suggest that workplace networks are a relevant channel of information diﬀusion thereby
signiﬁcantly improving the allocation process of workers to jobs.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the data, discuss the
main identiﬁcation issues and motivate the empirical strategy. Next, we turn to the
results. We ﬁrst thoroughly discuss the strength of our identiﬁcation strategy focussing
on unemployment duration and then move on to the analysis of network eﬀects on other
relevant outcomes. Section (5) discusses the results and oﬀers additional evidence in favor
of the main identifying assumptions. Section (6) concludes.
2 Data and identiﬁcation.
We draw on three National Social Security Service (INPS) archives providing information
on any work episode occurred over the period 1975-1997 in two Italian provinces10. As
concerns ﬁrms, we have information on their geographic location at the town level and
3-digit industry aﬃliation, starting and, if applies, ceasing dates; as to the workers, the
data provide a whole set of demographic characteristics (gender, date and town of birth,
town of residence); as to the speciﬁc match, we know its starting and ending dates, the
number of weeks worked each year, the corresponding yearly wage, the employment status
at monthly frequency. Individuals have also been tracked so that the same information is
available whenever they were employed at a ﬁrm in other areas of the country.
10A province is an administrative unit composed of smaller towns. The two provinces we focus upon
are Treviso and Vicenza, located in the northern region of Veneto, and contain, respectively, 121 and 95
towns, each with an average working-age population of about 5,000.13
2.1 Networks and network characteristics.
We study job information networks among workplace contacts by assessing the inﬂuence of
past coworkers’ current labor market status on individual job search outcomes. Workplace
contacts are a natural set of people to look at. Previous coworkers are likely to be a main
source of information and referrals when searching for a job for the simple fact that they
have shared the same workplace, thereby being reasonably aware of the unemployed skills
and possibly more likely to be exposed to information relevant to him. The features of
the labor market we focus upon are supportive of the assumption that coworkers can be
actual contacts. First, it is concentrated in a small geographical area, about 5,000 square
km, the maximum distance between two towns being 110 km. Second, it is characterized
by small ﬁrms: the median size is 6 while the 75th percentile is 13. Third, the density of
economic activity is signiﬁcantly higher than in the rest of Italy: in 1991 there were about
23 manufacturing ﬁrms and 345 manufacturing employees per square km as opposed to
an Italian average of, respectively, 8 ﬁrms and 117 employees. Finally, the area is a highly
self-contained labor market: in 1991 more than 80 percent of manufacturing workers in
the area were also residents.
We focus on a sample of about 9,000 working-age individuals displaced by more than
1,000 ﬁrm closures occurred over the period 1980-9511. In practice, we deﬁne the speciﬁc
network of social contacts tracking each displaced over the ﬁve years prior to his displace-
11As most administrative sources, our data do not report the reason why a given job ended. This is
particularly relevant in our setting, since the (unobserved) decision of quitting may, among other things,
depend on the characteristics of one’s network. For example, an individual could decide to quit because
his network allows him to quickly ﬁnd a new job. Focussing on exogenously displaced workers controls
for this and other sources of endogeneity. An additional shortcoming of administrative records is the lack
of information on whether, when and how workers actively search for a new job. Throughout the paper
we will thus follow the common practice of analyzing non-employment spells rather than unemployment
ones as deﬁned by ILO’s guidelines.14
ment, a convenient time interval we call the network building period (henceforth NB),
and recovering the pool of individuals he has been working with for at least one month.
This group of individuals lays at the basis of all our analysis12. We use the information
available for each coworker - the same available for the displaced - to describe several
characteristics of the network: its employment rate, the sectoral and geographical distri-
bution of contacts, their wages and tenure elapsed in the current ﬁrm, their number, the
intensity of the tie they have with the displaced and the degree of competition for the
information they carry. Throughout the paper we measure network characteristics as of
displacement date.
Table (1) reports some descriptive statistics of the closing ﬁrms and the individual
networks. Rows represent variables for which we have computed means at the closing ﬁrm
(panel A) or workplace network (panel B) level; columns report statistics on the sample
distribution of these means. Co-displaced workers are relatively young, the median closing
ﬁrm with an average age of about 27, and typically blue collar workers. They tend to live
in the same city (LLS) where their employer is located, although not in the same smaller
town13.
As concerns workplace networks, their size appears to be reasonable, a consequence
of the limited ﬁrm size in the underlying labor market. The number of contacts ranges
from 8 persons (10th percentile) to 150 (90th percentile), with a mean of 32. The average
share of contacts who are employed at displacement is around 67 percent, with a standard
12We neglect co-displaced workers who are more likely to be competitors than useful acquaintances.
13A city is deﬁned as a cluster of smaller towns characterized by a self-contained labor market, as
determined by the Italian National Statistical Institute (INSI) on the basis of the degree of workday
commuting by the resident population. Using 1991 census data, the INSI procedure identiﬁed 19 such
cities in the two provinces under analysis.15
deviation of about 20 percentage points. Contacts’ live nearby the displaced, the median
network displaying an average distance of 5.5 km, and generally in the same city. However,
as for co-displaced workers, within cities contacts do not appear to be clustered in the
same (smaller) towns. Contacts’ are slightly more likely to be males, reﬂecting the higher
participation rates of men; average age diﬀerences range from 4 to 15 years, with a grand
mean of about 9 years.
2.2 Identiﬁcation of network eﬀects
Throughout the paper we will focus on linear estimating equations of the form:
yijt0 = γNETijt0 + Xijt0β + Wijt0δ + νijt0 (1)
where the variable of interest y for individual i displaced at time t0 from ﬁrm j is related
to (a set of) characteristics of the network NETijt0, accounting for a number of individual
and ﬁrm controls Xijt0 and a set of local labour market conditions Wijt0 measured at the
date of displacement.
The usual criticism to causal interpretations of least squares estimates of γ in equations
like (1) is that the empirical correlation between individual outcomes and network char-
acteristics may rather be due to group members sharing some attributes, to their being
exposed to the same environment or subject to the same shocks (Manski (1993), Moﬃtt
(2001)). In our setting network members are past coworkers who could share the same
unobservables if the labor market sorted them along these dimensions. For example, the
displaced and his contacts’ probability of employment may be correlated simply because
more able individuals tend to work together and ability also implies higher employment16
rates. Likewise, the displaced and his contacts may acquire speciﬁc skills while in the
same ﬁrm thereby being exposed to the same skill-speciﬁc labor market shocks.
We address these crucial issues in a number of complementary ways. First, since the
pool of contacts is accumulated through time and varies across co-displaced workers, in
estimating (1) we can account for a closing-ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect (CFFE). This implies that
identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcients of interest is based on comparisons of workers displaced
by the same ﬁrm. By absorbing their average unobservable characteristics, the CFFE
mitigates the concerns that the estimated network eﬀects reﬂect omitted-variable biases,
the more so the more similar co-displaced workers are along the dimensions of selection.
If individuals endowed with the same skills always work together the CFFE completely
absorbs the spurious correlation between the displaced and his contacts’ current labor
market outcomes. While in the absence of sorting CFFE would be irrelevant, it would be
insuﬃcient if sorting did not lead to full segregation of skills across ﬁrms. In such case,
the sorting variable would display residual variability among co-displaced workers. To
be a source of concern in our exercise, however, market-driven sorting must reﬂect into
speciﬁc individual labor market outcomes (as wages or employment status) and coworkers
characteristics (as their employment rate or average compensation). This implies that
past realizations of the relevant variables represent reliable proxies for the unobserved
dimensions of sorting. The econometric speciﬁcation will include, among others, the
unemployed pre-displacement wage and employment proﬁles along with a number of past
ﬁrms characteristics including their average size and the average wages paid to network
members.
Finally, we account for the possibility that displaced individuals and their contacts17
are exposed to asymmetric labor market shocks. Closing-ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects already absorb
shocks common to co-displaced workers, over and above those induced by the speciﬁc date,
location and industry of the closing ﬁrm. However, within-ﬁrm heterogeneity in residential
location implies that co-displaced workers (and possibly their contacts) may be exposed to
time-varying location-speciﬁc shocks to their employment opportunities; we account for
this possibility by inclusion of a full set of city-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Similarly, year-industry
(at 3-digit level) ﬁxed eﬀects account for the possibility that within-ﬁrm heterogeneity
in pre-displacement sectoral experience exposes diﬀerent networks to diﬀerent industry
shocks14.
Our main identifying assumption is that, conditional on this set of controls, variation
in contacts labor market status at displacement date is orthogonal to individual hetero-
geneity within closing ﬁrms. The assumption would fail if our controls missed individual
ﬁxed characteristics that, while shared by past coworkers in pre-displacement ﬁrms, are
not shared by the co-displaced and, while not aﬀecting a number of pre-displacement
outcomes and ﬁrm characteristics (wages, employment, location, etc.), do aﬀect them
after displacement; also, it would fail due to labor market shocks not captured by the
closing ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, the city-year ﬁxed eﬀect or the industry-year ﬁxed eﬀect. While
conclusive evidence on the causal eﬀect of workplace network characteristics can only be
obtained in a pseudo-experimental framework, we think the most plausible sources of
omitted variable bias are accounted for in our setting. Our interpretation is that varia-
tion in contacts’ current labor market status generates exogenous changes the information
available in the network and potentially transmitted to the displaced. In section (5) we
14We deﬁne sectoral skill dummies by looking at the sector where the displaced spent most of his tenure
in the pre-displacement period. More details will be given in the next section.18
will present a set of exercises in support of the main identifying assumptions. We now
turn to the main results.
3 Networks and Unemployment Duration.
Because it aﬀects both the amount of available information on existing job opportunities
and the willingness to share it, contacts’ labor market status represents the main charac-
teristic of job information networks. We start our empirical analysis relating individual
unemployment duration to the share of employed contacts available in each network at the
date of displacement, a measure of their current average wage premium and the (log of the)
number of contacts15. Contacts’ wage premium captures either the fact that high wage
acquaintances share more information or the fact that, a higher wage premium signaling
a higher quality, they are able to provide more credible referrals (e.g. Calvo-Armengol
(2004), Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994), Montgomery (1991)).
Estimates reported in the ﬁrst column of (2) only account for a limited set of individual
characteristics (age, sex, tenure and qualiﬁcation at closure), and the CFFE. Unemploy-
ment duration appears to be signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with the network
employment rate and, to a lesser extent, with the contacts’ wage premium, while we do
not ﬁnd any eﬀect of network size. In this simple speciﬁcation all unobserved heterogene-
ity potentially correlated with network characteristics is assumed to be captured by the
CFFE. To account for the possibility that, while correlated with own networks, individual
unobserved characteristics diﬀer among co-displaced workers, in column 2 we include the
15The contacts’ average wage premium is obtained as the network average of the residuals from a wage
equation estimated on all individuals belonging to some network and employed at displacement date,
controlling for a quadratic in age, sex qualiﬁcation and time dummies.19
displaced earnings proﬁle over the 5 pre-displacement years (captured combining average
wage at closure and average wage growth) and the average length of his unemployment
spells in the same period16. If, as most theories suggest, sorting occurs along character-
istics that, though not directly observable, reﬂect into wages or employment likelihood
over time (e.g. ability), accounting for past individual realizations of these outcomes ab-
sorbs the (potential) residual correlation between unemployment duration and network
characteristics. In fact, while both indicators are signiﬁcantly related with unemployment
duration, attracting the expected sign, the coeﬃcient on the network employment rate is
largely unaﬀected.
We next address the possibility that the relevant unobservables, while not reﬂected into
individual pre-displacement outcomes such as wages and unemployment, are correlated
with characteristics or the number of past ﬁrms. Compensating wage theory suggests that
workers might sort across ﬁrms on the basis of their preferences for the combination of
wage and non-wage beneﬁts oﬀered by the ﬁrm (Rosen (1986)). Thus, for example, large
ﬁrms may be able to attract better workers by oﬀering fringe beneﬁts such as day care,
health insurance, meals (Woodbury (1983), Oyer (2005)). Similarly, they are shown to be
more likely to provide training opportunities to their employees (Oi and Idson (1999)).
Alternatively, workers may be attracted to certain ﬁrms by the quality of its workforce,
for example because this generates learning opportunities, a better working environment
or other amenities the individual values positively. As to the number of job switches,
it may be associated with changes in the working environment17. Results in column 3
16Results are unchanged if we allow for a considerably more ﬂexible speciﬁcation that considers the
whole pre-displacement wage and employment history in the estimating equation.
17Our data do not allow to distinguish the causes of job separations. The number of visited ﬁrms could
therefore either capture voluntary job-switching, plausibly associated with improved working conditions20
account for a measure of peer quality at past ﬁrms - the average wage paid to coworkers
- along with the average size and the number of ﬁrms the unemployed visited in the
pre-displacement period. Notice that these two last controls imply, in particular, that
variation in the measure of network extension is induced by coworkers turnover at each
past ﬁrm. Accounting for these controls yields a larger and more precisely estimated eﬀect
of the network employment rate.
Finally, we address the possibility that our results are driven by shocks common to
network members and not captured by the CFFE. This would be the case if, for example,
contacts have accumulated the same speciﬁc skills - but co-displaced workers diﬀer in
the skills they accumulated in the past - so that diﬀerent networks could be subject to
diﬀerent industry-speciﬁc shocks. Similarly, if individuals mostly work locally - but not
while in the closing ﬁrm - they would be largely subject to the same local shocks as
their contacts. In column 4 we augment the speciﬁcation with a full set of city-year ﬁxed
eﬀects for the displaced city of residence and a full set of 3-digit industry-year ﬁxed eﬀects
corresponding to the sector where the displaced accumulated the longest tenure over the
NB period18. Inclusion of these controls amounts to assuming that the displaced is directly
exposed to city- and industry-speciﬁc shocks, that is he learns about the randomly arising
opportunities in his local labor market and in the industry where he accumulated most
of his experience independently from his contacts. Allowing for these additional controls
does not change the basic result that a larger share of employed contacts leads to a
(including the quality of co-workers), or involuntary separations due to ﬁring, plausibly signalling poor
worker quality.
18We have experimented with other plausible deﬁnitions of sector experience and results were unaf-
fected. For example, we have used dummies for the most recent visited sector excluding the closing ﬁrm,
which is captured by the CFFE.21
shorter unemployment spell; the weak eﬀect of contacts’ quality detected in some of the
previous speciﬁcations disappears altogether. Results are also largely robust to using a
very ﬂexible speciﬁcation that allows for a quadratic in all control variables and all their
cross-products, together with the set of dummies considered so far (col. 5).
Consistently with theoretical predictions, the evidence reported in table (2) thus points
to a negative eﬀect of the share of employed contacts on unemployment duration, a result
that proves to be robust to controls for the most plausible omitted-variable hypotheses.
The estimated coeﬃcient in column 4 implies that a one standard deviation increase in
network employment rate (corresponding to about 20 percentage points) reduces unem-
ployment duration by about 7 percent, almost 3 weeks for the average unemployment
spell. As a benchmark, increasing individual wage by one standard deviation would im-
ply a reduction in unemployment duration of about 10 percent, 1 month at the average
duration.
A puzzling feature of the results in table (2) is the absence of any scale eﬀect. However,
this may be a consequence of the measurement error induced by deﬁning the extension
of the network as the simple count of pre-displacement coworkers. In particular, we may
be assigning too many contacts to some individuals. For example, if an individual can-
not maintain more that Z contacts the measurement error would be zero whenever the
number of contacts does not exceed the threshold and ￿i = Ci −Z otherwise, where Ci is
the measured extension. Under these assumptions the measurement error would display
a mechanical and positive correlation with the underlying true network, C∗
i , generating
the standard attenuation bias. We attempt to shed light on this issue and develop a way
to correct the measurement error. More speciﬁcally, we take seriously the assumption22
that, above a certain threshold Z, the individual meets a coworker only with some prob-
ability. Let us assume we can rank coworkers in a given ﬁrm of size N > Z with some
distance metric from the displaced (say, because they work in diﬀerent units), and that
the probability of meeting farther individuals decays with distance at rate γ. Let the
P n = e−γ max{0,n−Z} the probability of meeting coworker who is in position n = {1,...,N}.
Now we have to deal with the fact that the true ranking within a ﬁrm is unknown.
Let P(ni = n) = 1/N the probability that coworker i is in position n of the rank-
ing19. Therefore, the probability that the displaced actually meets coworker i is given by
Pi =
PN
n=1 P(ni = n) ∗ P n =
PN
n=1 P n/N. Making use of the deﬁnition of P n, after some
algebra, we obtain Pi =
￿
Z + (e−γ/(1 − e−γ))(1 − e−γ(N−Z))
￿
/N. Knowing Z and γ we
can thus weight each assigned coworker and redeﬁne network measures accordingly. In
table (3) we use the corrected network measures and present results under alternative as-
sumptions on Z and γ. Results suggest that measurement issues may explain the absence
of scale eﬀects in previous speciﬁcations. Even assuming a slow decay of the probability
of meeting additional workers we detect some negative eﬀect of scale consistently with
theoretical predictions. The eﬀect loses signiﬁcance as we increase the threshold or lower
the decay rate, thereby going back to the original error-ridden measure. Reassuringly, the
results on the eﬀects of the network employment rate are largely unaﬀected: we detect a
higher precision and larger point estimates in line with an attenuation bias also on this
variable.
Overall, these results suggest that contacts’ current employment status favours re-entry
into employment, possibly because it shapes the information they are able or willing to
19This probability is obtained noticing that in ﬁrm of size N there are N! possible rankings of the
workers and (N − 1)! rankings such that a given position is occupied by a speciﬁc coworker.23
disseminate in the network. Before moving on to a deeper qualiﬁcation of contacts’ at-
tributes a point may be worth emphasizing. In a standard search model, the rate at which
the unemployed ﬁnds a suitable job is given by λF(wR), where λ is the job oﬀer arrival
rate, wR is the reservation wage, itself a function of λ, and F(.) the distribution oﬀers are
drawn from. Therefore, while theory suggests reasons why network characteristics can af-
fect both λ and F(.), it is in general hard to disentangle the two channels. This is so even
if we allow for on-the-job search so that the probability of ﬁnding a job is simply λF(b),
with b being the unemployment beneﬁt20. However, the Italian institutional setting lacks
a proper unemployment insurance scheme. Therefore, if one is willing to make the above
assumptions, the probability of ﬁnding a job would be λF(0) = λ, suggesting that we can
plausibly interpret the estimates as direct eﬀects on the arrival rate.
3.1 Information ﬂows and contacts’ characteristics.
A contacts’ propensity and ability to disseminate information depend on characteristics
of the tie he has with the displaced and on his access to information valuable to him.
Intuitively, a stronger tie is more likely to share information; similarly, a succesful job
seeker may be more informed on current employment opportunities. Diﬀerences in these
characteristics yield important qualiﬁcations on the role of employed contacts and shed
further light on the workings of job information networks.
The intensity of ties is arguably the major determinant of the willingness to share
information. In our setting a natural deﬁnition of intensity is the time the displaced
20This obtains if the arrival rate of job oﬀers when unemployed and when employed are the same, so
that all oﬀers above b are accepted.24
spent in the same workplace with a certain contact; average exposure thus provides a
synthetic plausible measure of the strength of ties the displaced has with his workplace
contacts. Conditional on the time he spent on average in each ﬁrm, variation in intensity
is induced by the timing of contacts’ turnover at past ﬁrms. Insofar as the determinants
of past turnover are independent of the displaced current unobserved characteristics, we
are able to identify the eﬀects of tighter ties on unemployment duration. In column 2 of
table (4) we augment the main speciﬁcation (whose results are reported in column 1) with
our intensity measures. Results show that longer exposure to currently employed contacts
shortens unemployment duration. More speciﬁcally, a one standard deviation increase in
average exposure (corresponding to slightly less than 10 months) reduces unemployment
duration by 9 percent. Interestingly, lower exposure to future unemployed coworkers turns
out to have a similar eﬀect, suggesting the presence of congestion eﬀects at the ﬁrm level.
A longer presence in the ﬁrm of coworkers who will not be useful sources of information at
the future displacement date relative to those who will may in fact reduce the net exposure
to each contact, thus weakening the strength of the tie with a currently employed contact.
Information diﬀusion within the network is also likely to be shaped by the degree of com-
petition for the available information. As shown by Calvo-Armengol (2004) and Wahba
and Zenou (2005) the advantages of being connected to an employed individual decrease
with the number of other job seekers he is in contact with. In this sense, the previous
results on the eﬀects of a higher employment rate could reﬂect both the fact that more
information is generated in a network with a higher number of employed contacts and, at
the same time, the lower competition for the available information signalled by a lower
unemployment rate. To single out these two eﬀects we develop an intuitive measure of25
competition for the available information held by a given contact, namely the number of
contemporaneously displaced individuals he is connected to. Variation across codisplaced
workers is induced by diﬀerences in the number of contemporaneously displaced individu-
als (by a diﬀerent ﬁrm closure) their contacts are linked to21. In this sense, it provides an
exogenous shift in the degree of competition for a given information source. Augmenting
the basic speciﬁcation with the average number of competitors shows that a higher degree
of competition signiﬁcantly slows down re-employment (col. 3). Speciﬁcally, increasing
the number of competitors by 8 units (corresponding to a shift from the 1st to the 3rd
quartile in our sample) raises unemployment duration by about 6 percent.
The above results show that, given the available information, tighter ties and lower
competition for it increase the probability of leaving unemployment. We now turn to an
analysis of factors that determine the amount of valuable information a contact can share.
The ﬁrst distinction we draw is between employed contacts who have recently changed
job (movers) and those who still keep the one where they met the displaced (stayers).
By the same fact they are no longer employed in a ﬁrm the displaced already visited,
movers are in fact relatively more likely to be endowed with relevant information, the
more so if switching job plausibly requires some search and collecting information which
can then be spread through the network. In column 5 we split the share of employed
contacts into contacts who still maintain the job where they met the displaced and those
who meanwhile changed employer. Results show this distinction is highly relevant. The
eﬀect of an increase in the network employment rate on duration more than doubles when
stemming from a higher share of movers as opposed to a higher share of stayers. More
21Note that if a contact is connected only to workers displaced by the same ﬁrm the degree of compe-
tition does not vary across codisplaced workers.26
speciﬁcally, according to our estimates a one standard deviation increase in employment
rate due to a higher share of movers reduces unemployment duration by around 11 percent,
corresponding to about 5 weeks for the average unemployment spell; the reduction would
be around 15 days if the increase in the employment rate was due to a larger share of
stayers22.
The same distinction is carried through to columns 6 and 7 where we address two addi-
tional aspects that plausibly signal access to more relevant information, namely techno-
logical and geographical proximity. In either case, the basic intuition is simple. Contacts
employed in sectors the displaced is more familiar with likely play a more relevant role
when locating attractive job opportunities; the same holds true for contacts employed in
the local market if workers have a preference for working close to their own residence23.
Results conﬁrm the intuition, further stressing the importance of recent job switchers.
For example, a mover employed in the displacing sector is twice more eﬀective, in terms
of the unemployed chances of getting a job, than one employed in a diﬀerent industry;
the same qualitative result is true when we look at the geographic location of movers,
although the additional eﬀect is lower. On the other hand, only the sectoral distribution
of stayers seems to matter24.
22We also ﬁnd that the more recent the job switch the stronger the eﬀect of a given share of movers,
in line with the intuition that they carry more up-to-date and thus valuable information. Results are
available upon request.
23For example, if oﬀers from farther locations involve a commuting cost, the worker will set a higher
reservation wage for jobs at those locations. Additionally, if the arrival rate of oﬀers also depends of search
eﬀort (say, acquaintances must be contacted) the lower expected wage of an oﬀer from those locations
would lead to put less eﬀort into search for these jobs. Note this would be the case even if the support
of the wage distributions was the same at both locations and always above the commuting cost.
24As a natural consequence of these ﬁndings, increasing network proximity should induce the displaced
to re-enter in geographically or technologically closer ﬁrms. Results not reported here (available upon
request) show that this is the case: a higher share of contacts in the displacing sector increases the chances
of being re-employed in that sector and the new job is also closer to the displaced hometown the more
movers are employed around it.27
Finally, results in columns 8 and 9, obtained using speciﬁcations that include all network
characteristics, largely conﬁrm the above discussion.
3.2 Network eﬀects during unemployment.
Our evidence so far points to the existence of signiﬁcant network eﬀects on the expected
duration of unemployment. We also showed, however, that the information provided by
contacts proves more eﬀective when more plausibly recent. This section further charac-
terizes our ﬁndings exploring whether the movers-stayers composition of networks - which
captures the recentness of available information - has diﬀerent eﬀects on the probability
of leaving unemployment at diﬀerent horizons.
In table (5) we report estimates for a set of linear models of the probability of being still
unemployed at diﬀerent points in time: for example, the dependent variables in column
1 is a dummy equal to 1 if the displaced is still unemployed one month after the closure.
Network characteristics are measured, as above, as of displacement date25. A larger share
of employed contacts lowers the probability of leaving unemployment at all horizons.
However, diﬀerent subsets of contacts drive the result at diﬀerent durations. This can be
seen clearly in ﬁgure (1). At each month after displacement we plot the ratio between the
probability of being still unemployed implied by an increase of one standard deviation in
the network employment rate and the average probability of unemployment. The lines
correspond to two alternative experiments, where the increase in the employment rate is
due to a) a higher share of movers, b) a higher share of stayers.
25In principle, our data allows us to update the description of one’s network as unemployment proceeds.
However, we would no longer be able to control for common shocks aﬀecting both the displaced probability
of leaving unemployment and the employment status of his contacts.28
Several facts are worth noticing. First, and consistently with our previous discussion,
the advantages of being connected to a network with a higher share of recent job-switchers
materialize immediately after displacement. For example, after three months the proba-
bility of being unemployed is 8 percent lower than the baseline if the higher employment
rate is induced by a higher share of movers; in the case of stayers the diﬀerence is only 1
percent, and not statistically signiﬁcant. On the contrary, the probability of unemploy-
ment at longer horizons is the same, irrespective of the source of the higher employment
rate. Importantly, the fact that at longer horizons both experiments imply a roughly
constant ratio with the baseline probability means that the structure of the network at
displacement date does not aﬀect the corresponding conditional probabilities of leaving
unemployment26. As a whole, these results suggest that diﬀerences in the relevance of
information diﬀused by networks with diﬀerent composition are subject to relatively fast
rates of decay over time27.
4 Networks, Entry Wages and Job Stability.
The previous section has shown that being connected to a larger share of employed con-
tacts signiﬁcantly contributes to speeding up reentry into employment, the more so the
more recently the contact changed job. However, the role of contacts for job characteristics
26This can be seen easily by noticing that the lines plotted are the ratios between the survival probabili-
ties. Let T, unemployment duration, be distributed according to a distribution function ¯ F(t) = Pr(T ≤ t)
if the network has the average characteristics, and FX(t) if we increase the network employment rate
by increasing X = {movers,stayer}. Then the ﬁgure plots the ratios R(t) =
1−F
X(t)
1− ¯ F(t) . The sign of the






which is the diﬀerence between the hazards of leaving unemployment at time t implied by the two distri-
butions, ¯ F,FX.
27These results hold unaﬀected when we also control for the intensity of ties and the degree of compe-
tition in the network. Results are available upon request.29
is less clearcut, their attributes potentially aﬀecting the features of the new job in several
ways. For example, high earning contacts may generate a higher expected wage because
they pass on oﬀers they do not ﬁnd proﬁtable (among others, Calvo-Armengol (2004),
Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994)) or because better contacts provide a prospective em-
ployer with superior information on the applicant (Montgomery (1991). Additionally, by
reducing the uncertainty on the new hire, contacts’ referrals may also lead to a longer
expected tenure in the new job (Jovanovic (1979)). On the other hand, certain contacts’
characteristics may also lead to lower wages. For example, if the provided information
concerns jobs somehow unsuited to the unemployed (for example, by involving new tasks),
he may nonetheless decide to accept trading oﬀ the lower quality with a shorter unem-
ployment spell (Bentolila et al. (2004)); this in turn may also lead to a shorter tenure on
the new job.
While the above mechanisms point to reasons why contacts’ characteristics aﬀect the
distribution of job attributes, from the empirical point of view identifying such eﬀects
may be complicated by the fact that, following a reservation wage policy, the observed
distribution of job attributes is censored. As pointed out before, Italy has no proper un-
employment insurance scheme. To the extent that this implies displaced workers would
accept all job oﬀers they receive, the following results can be interpreted as direct eﬀects
of contacts’ characteristics on the underlying distribution of oﬀers. Table (6) reports es-
timates from our preferred speciﬁcation for a number of post-entry outcomes. Results in
column 1 show a positive eﬀect of contacts’ wage premium on post-displacement wages,
compatibly with either high wage contacts passing on high wage oﬀers or their provid-
ing more valuable referrals. Increasing contacts’ current wage premium by one standard30
deviation increases entry wages by 1.7 percent, corresponding to 4.2 percent of their stan-
dard deviation. As a benchmark, increasing own wage at displacement by one standard
deviation, raises entry wages by 5.7 percent (13.6 percent of the entry wage standard
deviation). On the other hand, while relevant in terms of unemployment duration the
share of employed contacts does not aﬀect entry wages. These ﬁndings are consistent
with the idea that, whatever the arrival rate of oﬀers, the option value of turning them
down is close to zero. In this case, although they will re-enter at a considerably faster
pace, displaced individuals endowed with high employment rate networks would still earn
a starting wage which is a random draw from a common distribution28.
These results largely carry through to job stability. Column 2 looks at the probability of
still holding the entry job 12 months after re-entry. Contacts’ wage premium has a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on subsequent job tenure. Again, increased stability might follow
from better contacts’ referrals substantially reducing uncertainty on the quality of the new
match, or their sharing information on better jobs, those below their reservation wage.
According to our estimates, a one standard deviation increase in contacts’ wage premium
increases the probability of holding the same job after one year by 2.7 percentage points,
corresponding to 4.5 percent of the average probability. Somewhat strikingly, individuals
endowed with a larger share of employed among their contacts are also less likely to
keep the entry job, a result entirely driven by the share of stayers (col. 3). Possibly, by
being more dated, information conveyed by stayers involves less desirable non-wage job
attributes, which are however traded oﬀ against a signiﬁcantly shorter unemployment
duration. In fact, consistently with the idea that all job oﬀers are accepted and job
28Note however, that their lifetime earnings are still higher because of the shorter unemployment spell.31
search continues on the job, the last column of the table shows that the probability of
employment at the same horizon, regardless of the employer identity, is unaﬀected by
network characteristics (col. 4). This suggests that those who initially ended up in less
favourable matches because of their contacts’ attributes, look for better opportunities and
eventually switch job. Note, however, that this does not imply there are no diﬀerences
between displaced one year after reentry. For one thing, those with higher quality contacts
are more likely to be in a better paying job.
The intensity of the ties with employed contacts, while irrelevant for entry wages, turns
out to increase job stability. Plausibly, stronger ties are more successful in supplying a
given employer with reliable information, thus leading to less separations. We also ﬁnd
evidence that a larger number of potential competitors reduces expected tenure in the
current job.
All in all, our ﬁndings conﬁrm that a thorough characterization of contacts’ labor market
attributes is crucial to unveil the mechanisms underlying the workings of job information
networks. As the above evidence shows, network characteristics that signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the duration of unemployment, do not play a major role in determining the features of
the new job. Conversely, while largely irrelevant in determining the speed of re-entry,
contacts’ quality turns out to improve the initial wage and the stability of the subsequent
job. Recalling that absence of an unemployment scheme allow us to plausibly interpret
the estimates as direct eﬀects of network characteristics on the arrival rate of job oﬀers
(previous section) and on the distribution of job characteristics (this section), the ﬁndings
suggest that contacts’ current employment status is crucial in channelling information on
available opportunities to job seekers. Thus, as theory suggests, even temporary shocks32
to the network employment rate may have long lasting eﬀects via their altering the overall
availability of information, the more so the more segregated the network. On the other
hand, contacts’ quality turns out to be the only determinant of important characteristics of
the subsequent job, thereby suggesting that employers may face serious screening problems
in hirings and additional information provided by referrals may signiﬁcantly reduce the
uncertainty involved in a new match. Another possible interpretation of the ﬁnding is
that contacts’ in better matches, by earning higher wages, are willing to share more
information. In both cases, insofar as our measure of contacts’ quality reﬂects somehow
the quality of the match they are in, policies favouring an eﬃcient allocation of workers to
jobs may have important spillovers either by increasing the amount of information passed
on to untargeted job seekers by their contacts or by complementing, via the referral eﬀect,
the information on new hires29.
5 Discussion and Robustness Checks.
The main identifying assumption required to interpret the previous estimates as eﬀects of
the information conveyed by a given network is that, conditional on the set of controls,
variation in contacts’ attributes at displacement date is orthogonal to individual unob-
served characteristics. As we discussed above, the source of this correlation lies in the
possibility that the labor market brings together workers with similar unobserved charac-
teristics or that, by having shared the workplace, contacts are subject to the same shocks
(for example, they acquire the same skills). In this section we provide indirect evidence
29Of course, there are no policy implications if our measure of contacts’ quality only reﬂects their innate
ability, rather than match speciﬁc quality by which the employer could trust a referral. However, since
results are conditional also on contacts’ past wage premia, this possibility is plausibly ruled out.33
in favor of our identifying assumption addressing three major concerns.
The ﬁrst source of concern is that our controls are not able to pick up unobserved ﬁxed
characteristics shared by the displaced and his contacts. If this was the case, however,
we should detect signiﬁcant empirical correlations when relating contacts’ attributes to
individual outcomes prior to displacement. In columns 1 to 4 of table (7) we relate network
characteristics to the weekly wage earned by the displaced 3 to 5 years before displacement
and to the time spent in employment in the same years30. Network characteristics have no
predictive power for these two outcomes, suggesting that results in the previous sections
are unlikely to be explained by omitted individual ﬁxed characteristics correlated with
network ones.
Second, we address the possibility that our results reﬂect a causal eﬀect of contacts’ ﬁxed
unobserved characteristics rather than of their current labor market attributes. While still
of interest, our estimates would quantify the eﬀects of exposure to contacts’ characteristics
rather than their disseminating information obtained on the basis of their current labor
market status. However, if this was the case we should be able to detect some signiﬁcant
correlation between individual post-displacement outcomes and his contacts’ labor market
conditions at some point prior to displacement. In columns 5 to 10 we report results
for unemployment duration, entry wages and the probability of holding the same job
12 months from re-entry using network characteristics as measured 4 years before the
individual was displaced31. Results show that past labor market contacts’ attributes are
30The only diﬀerence with respect to the main speciﬁcation is that, having pooled wage observations
for diﬀerent years, we also include year dummies to capture common cyclical variation in individual wages
and employment status.
31Speciﬁcally, we track each contact and recover his employment status and wage 4 years before dis-
placement. Since we cannot precisely pin down a month when to measure contacts’ attributes we proceed
as follows. As concerns employment, we weight every contact for the time he spent employed in the ﬁrst34
unable to predict any post-displacement outcomes. We read this as supportive of the
interpretation that the source of identiﬁcation is random variation in contacts’ current
conditions. This leads us to a third concern. In particular, we must be sure that random
variation in contacts’ current labor market attributes is not due to shocks that also aﬀect
the displaced. Our empirical strategy accounts for shocks that aﬀect equally co-displaced
workers and their contacts via the CFFE; also, the city-year and the 3-digit industry-year
dummies absorb all city-wide and industry-wide labor market shocks32. Identiﬁcation
thus hinges on variation in contacts’ labor market status among co-displaced workers
within city and within industry. We may however fail to capture industry-city speciﬁc
shocks. For example, a new plant requiring a speciﬁc skill in a given city would plausibly
aﬀect workers endowed with that skill and living in the city diﬀerently from co-residents
with diﬀerent skills or individuals with similar skills from other cities33. This would be a
concern if co-displaced workers (and their networks) were diﬀerent in terms of city-skills
combinations. We deal with this possibility in table (8). We re-ran the main regressions
allowing for a full set of 2-digit industry-city-year dummies; we also include town and
3-digit industry ﬁxed eﬀects to absorb permanent diﬀerences among towns in the same
city (e.g. distances) and among sub-industries belonging to the same 2-digit sector (e.g.
skills). Results are unaﬀected by this extension: we still ﬁnd that contacts employment
status and tenure are the main factors aﬀecting unemployment duration while contacts’
semester of the relevant year; a mover is deﬁned as a contact who in the ﬁrst semester was in a job other
than the one he held the previous year. Results are robust to alternative assumptions of employment
status as well as to alternative choices of the relevant pre-displacement year.
32Industry dummies are deﬁned on the basis of the 3-digit industry where the displaced accumulated
the longest tenure over the pre-displacement period.
33City-industry shocks may of course also be events taking place in other industries or cities that aﬀect
in the same way people with the same skills and in a given city. For example, a plant closing in a given
city-industry would possibly have eﬀects on neighboring cities and sectors through general equilibrium
eﬀects.35
wage premium is a signiﬁcant determinant of the entry wage and the degree of stability
of the subsequent job.
6 Conclusions
Local and non-market interactions have received a lot of attention as potential causes of
persistent segregation and diﬀerential behaviors along a number of dimensions. While the
sources of these eﬀects can be manifold (social norms, peer pressure, conformism), our
ﬁndings show that diﬀerential access to job-related information determined by diﬀerent
current labor market attributes of the network may be an important factor in shaping
them. Unemployment spells are signiﬁcantly shorter when a larger share of contacts
are currently employed, the eﬀect becoming stronger when contacts recently changed
job and are employed in markets plausibly more relevant to the displaced. Stronger
ties enhance network eﬀectiveness as a source of valuable information, while a higher
degree of competition for the information a given contact may share signiﬁcantly delays
re-employment. Contacts’ wage premium, at best a weak determinant of the probability
of re-employment, turns out to be an important determinant of subsequent wages and
job stability, consistently with the idea that contacts in better jobs disseminate superior
information.
The ﬁndings of this paper complement existing literature in several ways. First, we
explicitly focus on contacts’ labor market characteristics. While usually maintained as
important determinants of job-related information generated in a given network, these
aspects have received little empirical attention. Importantly, by looking at individual36
and his reference group labor market outcomes the analysis unveils signiﬁcant sources of
spillovers which should be taken into account when evaluating the cost-beneﬁt trade-oﬀ
of labor market policies. Second, by describing the eﬀects of several network character-
istics on a number of individual job search outcomes in a uniﬁed framework, we provide
a comprehensive assessment of the workings of job information networks. Finally, unlike
existing studies, we focus on workplace contacts, arguably a major source of information
and referrals for job seekers. Requiring contacts to have previously been coworkers makes
explicit why two individuals met and allows us to clarify the sources of potential omit-
ted variable bias. In particular, if contacts are to systematically share some unobserved
characteristics that aﬀect their labor market outcomes then it must be that the labor
market sorts workers along this dimension. We develop a number of controls for plausible
dimensions of sorting and show that our ﬁndings are largely robust to alternative speciﬁ-
cations of the information set. As a whole, while evidence based on pseudo-experimental
data would certainly be more conclusive, we believe the analysis accounts for the most
plausible and threatening sources of bias.
By not relying on speciﬁc policy interventions or on experimental studies our strategy
can be easily extended to other contexts. In particular, given the increased availability of
administrative worker-ﬁrm matched records, this approach makes it easy to perform cross-
country comparisons to assess the relative importance of informal hiring channels and,
possibly, their impact on the workings of aggregate labor markets. Additionally, one could
address the pervasiveness of workplace networks extending the analysis to alternative,
possibly non-labor, outcomes by linking standard administrative records as ours to other
data sources.37
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Percentile Mean Standard
10th 50th 90th Deviation
A. Codisplaced Workers.
Codisplaced 1 5 15 7.6 10.2
Average Age 20.2 26.7 37.8 28 7
Share Males 0 0.667 1 0.571 0.398
Share Blue Collar 0 1 1 0.82 0.328
Share Same LLS as CF 0.143 0.889 1 0.76 0.318
Share Same town as CF 0 0.333 1 0.382 0.332
B. Workplace Networks.
Total Contacts 8 32 150 60.3 81.1
Share Employed Contacts 0.428 0.68 0.901 0.668 0.193
Average Distance (km) 2.1 5.5 17.6 10.2 28.4
Share Same LLS as Displaced 0.119 0.772 0.947 0.66 0.296
Share Same Town as Displaced 0 0.2 0.593 0.254 0.233
Average Age Diﬀerence 4.3 8.2 15.1 9.1 4.6
Share Males 0.083 0.6 1 0.576 0.333
Table entries are the corresponding column statistic computed on the sample distribution of the
closing-ﬁrm level (panel A) and workplace network level (panel B) means of the row variable.38
Table 2: Unemployment duration and network characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Network Characteristics:
–Extension -0.022 0.026 -0.020 -0.047 -0.046
(0.018) (0.020) (0.038) (0.044) (0.047)
–Employment Rate -0.284∗ -0.306∗ -0.402∗∗ -0.365∗ -0.286†
(0.120) (0.120) (0.126) (0.148) (0.151)
–Wage Premium -0.242† -0.191 -0.251† -0.220 -0.287
(0.127) (0.128) (0.146) (0.174) (0.174)
Wage at displacement -0.227∗∗ -0.232∗∗ -0.242∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.067)
Wage Growth n NB 0.122 0.140 0.088
(0.109) (0.111) (0.123)
Average unemp. in NB 0.393∗∗ 0.513∗∗ 0.444∗∗
(0.083) (0.105) (0.119)







Average ﬁrm size in NB 0.032 0.054
(0.049) (0.057)
Average Cowkrs. Wage in NB 0.167 0.242
(0.144) (0.171)
Commuting in NB 0.055
(0.124)
Closing ﬁrm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year*City of Residence NO NO NO YES YES
Year*Sector Experience NO NO NO YES YES
Flex. Spec. NO NO NO NO YES
Obs. 9121 9121 9121 9121 9121
Adj. R2 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(
†) signiﬁcant at 10%; (
∗) signiﬁcant at 5%; (
∗∗) signiﬁcant at 1%.
Dependent variable is the (log of) months spent unemployed after displacement. All regressions also
include controls for gender, a quadratic in age and tenure in the closing ﬁrm and four qualiﬁcation
dummies. Flexible speciﬁcation is a quadratic of all previous controls and their cross-products.
Sector experience dummies are deﬁned on the basis of the longest pre-displacement sector tenure
of the displaced.39
Table 3: Measurement error corrections.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Z: 5 10 15 20
γ = 0.25
Extension -0.139† -0.100† -0.087† -0.079
Employment Rate -0.430∗∗ -0.423∗∗ -0.413∗∗ -0.403∗∗
Wage Premium -0.212 -0.211 -0.211 -0.212
γ = 0.75
Extension -0.162∗ -0.105† -0.090† -0.081
Employment Rate -0.431∗∗ -0.425∗∗ -0.416∗∗ -0.406∗∗
Wage Premium -0.213 -0.212 -0.211 -0.212
γ = 1.25
Extension -0.169∗ -0.106† -0.090† -0.081
Employment Rate -0.431∗∗ -0.426∗∗ -0.416∗∗ -0.406∗∗
Wage Premium -0.213 -0.212 -0.211 -0.212
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(
†) signiﬁcant at 10%; (
∗) signiﬁcant at 5%; (
∗∗) signiﬁcant at 1%.
Econometric model is as in col. 4 of table (2). Network characteristics








/N if N > Z and Pi = 1
otherwise.4
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Table 4: Unemployment duration and employed contacts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Information diﬀusion Information relevance
Extension -0.047 -0.054 -0.008 -0.014 -0.072 -0.076† -0.075† -0.038 -0.046
(0.044) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048)
Wage Premium -0.220 -0.219 -0.205 -0.205 -0.198 -0.186 -0.216 -0.180 -0.186
(0.174) (0.175) (0.174) (0.174) (0.174) (0.173) (0.173) (0.174) (0.172)
Employment Rate -0.365∗ -0.373∗ -0.299∗ -0.305∗
(0.148) (0.148) (0.150) (0.151)
Intensity:
- with Employed -0.009∗ -0.010∗ -0.009∗ -0.009∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
- with Unemployed 0.010∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Competition 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗ 0.007∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Share of Stayers -0.281† -0.064 -0.426∗ -0.210 -0.129
(0.149) (0.176) (0.178) (0.152) (0.201)
Share of Movers -0.602∗∗ -0.335† -0.395∗ -0.549∗∗ -0.142
(0.173) (0.203) (0.191) (0.175) (0.216)
Technological Distance:
Share Stayers in Displacing Sector -0.300∗ -0.324∗
(0.139) (0.140)
Share Movers in Displacing Sector -0.454∗ -0.374∗
(0.177) (0.179)
Geographic Distance:
Share Nearby Stayers 0.214 0.216
(0.141) (0.142)
Share Nearby Movers -0.277∗ -0.253∗
(0.111) (0.111)
Obs. 9121 9121 9121 9121 9121 9121 9121 9121 9121
Adj. R2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses. (
†) signiﬁcant at 10%; (
∗) signiﬁcant at 5%; (
∗∗) signiﬁcant at 1%.
All regressions include controls for gender, a quadratic in age and tenure in the closing ﬁrm, four qualiﬁcation dummies, wage at displacement, wage growth and
average unemployment over the NB period, dummies for the number of ﬁrms visited over the NB period, their average size, commuted distance, a closing ﬁrm
FE, year-city of residence and year-3-digit sectoral experience ﬁxed eﬀects. Nearby contacts are deﬁned as those living in towns whose distance from the displaced
residence is less than the median distance between displaced and contacts in the sample.4
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Table 5: Unemployment duration and network characteristics at diﬀerent horizons.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. var. Unemployed after:
1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 15 months 18 months
Extension -0.043∗ -0.037† -0.021 -0.001 -0.019 -0.004 -0.003
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Share of Stayers 0.021 -0.007 -0.110 -0.329∗∗ -0.244∗∗ -0.213∗∗ -0.176∗∗
(0.059) (0.068) (0.067) (0.063) (0.057) (0.053) (0.049)
Share of Movers -0.184∗∗ -0.152† -0.195∗ -0.291∗∗ -0.206∗∗ -0.198∗∗ -0.179∗∗
(0.068) (0.078) (0.077) (0.073) (0.067) (0.063) (0.058)
Wage premium -0.173∗ -0.089 0.025 0.048 0.049 0.037 0.036
(0.071) (0.082) (0.081) (0.072) (0.065) (0.062) (0.057)
Obs. 9121 9121 9121 9121 9121 9121 9121
F(Stayer=Mover) 20.93 8.12 3.02 0.51 0.69 0.07 0.03
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.47 0.40 0.79 0.85
Robust standard errors in parentheses. (
†) signiﬁcant at 10%; (
∗) signiﬁcant at 5%; (
∗∗) signiﬁcant at 1%.
All regressions include controls for gender, a quadratic in age and tenure in the closing ﬁrm, four qualiﬁcation dummies, wage
at displacement, wage growth and average unemployment over the NB period, dummies for the number of ﬁrms visited over the
NB period, their average size, commuted distance, a closing ﬁrm FE, year-city of residence and year-3-digit sectoral experience
interactions.42
Table 6: Network characteristics, entry wages and job stability.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 year after entry:
Entry Wage Same Job Employed
Extension 0.006 -0.039† -0.015 0.003
(0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017)
Wage Premium 0.122∗ 0.193∗ 0.167∗ -0.078
(0.059) (0.086) (0.085) (0.063)
Employment Rate -0.052 -0.324∗∗ -0.009
(0.051) (0.071) (0.055)
Competition -0.000 -0.003∗ -0.004∗ -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Intensity:
- with Employed 0.000 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
- with Unemployed -0.000 -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ 0.000





Obs. 9121 8531 8531 8531
Robust standard errors in parentheses. (
∗) signiﬁcant at 5%; (
∗∗) signiﬁcant at 1%.
Columns (2-4): linear probability models. Dependent variable: Y = 1 if still in entry job
after 1 year (cols. 2 and 3); Y = 1 if employed after 1 year from re-entry, irrespective of
employer’s identity (col. 4).
All regressions include controls for gender, a quadratic in age and tenure in the closing ﬁrm,
four qualiﬁcation dummies, wage at displacement, wage growth and average unemployment
over the NB period, dummies for the number of ﬁrms visited over the NB period, their
average size, commuted distance, a closing ﬁrm FE, year-city of residence and year-3-digit
sectoral experience ﬁxed eﬀects.4
3
Table 7: Robustness checks.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Individual Pre-Displacement Past Contacts Characteristics
Current % Sem. Unemployment Entry Same Job
Weekly Wage Unemployed Duration Weekly Wage after 12m
Extension 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.014 -0.061 -0.061 0.013 0.014 -0.038† -0.037†
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.045) (0.045) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021)
Employment Rate -0.024 0.027 -0.035 -0.035 -0.010 -0.011 0.105 0.103
(0.028) (0.037) (0.158) (0.158) (0.050) (0.050) (0.074) (0.074)
Share of Stayers -0.026 0.024
(0.029) (0.037)
Share of Movers -0.016 0.047 0.003 0.095 0.136
(0.030) (0.045) (0.239) (0.074) (0.110)
Wage Premium 0.048 0.048 -0.063 -0.064 0.072 0.072 0.000 0.002 0.083 0.085
(0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.180) (0.180) (0.058) (0.058) (0.084) (0.084)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. (
†) signiﬁcant at 10%; (
∗) signiﬁcant at 5%; (
∗∗) signiﬁcant at 1%.
Columns (1)-(2): dependent variable is weekly wage 3 to 5 years before displacement. Columns (3)-(4): dependent variable is share
of 1st semester spent unemployed 3 to 5 years before displacement. Columns (5)-(10): contacs characteristics are determned 4 years
before displacement: employment rate is computed weighting each contact for the share of the 1st semester he spent employed; a mover
is a contact who in the ﬁrst semester of the year was in a job other than the one held the previous year.
All regressions include controls for gender, a quadratic in age and tenure in the closing ﬁrm, four qualiﬁcation dummies, wage at
displacement, wage growth and average unemployment over the NB period, dummies for the number of ﬁrms visited over the NB
period, their average size, commuted distance, a closing ﬁrm FE, year-city of residence and year-3-digit sectoral experience interactions.44
Table 8: Robustness to city-industry shocks.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment Entry 1 Year Job
Duration Weekly Wage Stability
Extension -0.058 -0.086† -0.001 -0.001 -0.025 0.006
(0.048) (0.049) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023)
Employment rate -0.372∗ -0.063 -0.323∗∗
(0.163) (0.055) (0.078)
Share of Stayers -0.282† -0.063 -0.427∗∗
(0.164) (0.057) (0.079)
Share of Movers -0.627∗∗ -0.064 -0.034
(0.191) (0.060) (0.089)
Wage Premium -0.147 -0.122 0.156∗ 0.156∗ 0.212∗ 0.183∗
Obs. 9121 9121 8528 8528 8531 8531
Adj. R2 0.25 0.25 0.91 0.91 0.09 0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(
†) signiﬁcant at 10%: (
∗) signiﬁcant at 5%; (
∗∗) signiﬁcant at 1%.
All regressions include controls for gender, a quadratic in age and tenure in the closing ﬁrm,
four qualiﬁcation dummies, wage at displacement, wage growth and average unemployment
over the NB period, dummies for the number of ﬁrms visited over the NB period, their
average size, commuted distance, a closing ﬁrm FE, dummies for town of residence and
3-digit sectoral experience and interactions 2-digit industry-city-year.45
Figure 1: Network eﬀects at various horizons.
Months from displacement
 Increase Share Movers  Increase Share Stayers






Ratios between implied and average probability of still being unemployed at a given horizon. Implied probabilities are
computed increasing, respectively, the share of movers and the share of stayers by one standard deviation of the overall
employment rate.References
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